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CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
Gregory R. Bishop *
Laurence V. Parker, Jr. **
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Virginia Stock Corporation Act (the "Virginia Act")
was extensively revised and updated for the first time since 1985.
Having just undertaken such a major revision to the Virginia Act,
the General Assembly further amended the Act in a more tar-
geted fashion in 2006 and 2007. Section II of this article ad-
dresses some of the changes that have taken place since the 2005
amendments and gives a brief overview of some conforming
changes that have been incorporated in the Virginia Nonstock
Corporation Act (the "Nonstock Act").
There has also been a concerted effort to conform the language
and substance of the various other business entity statutes over
the past two years. Section III discusses some of the changes to
the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act (the "LLC Act") and
the Virginia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the "Vir-
ginia RULPA") that conform these Acts to the Virginia Act in
some respects. This section also includes a discussion of other
changes to these Acts that are entity-specific.
Section IV addresses some amendments that affect professional
corporations and professional limited liability companies. The
amendments were designed to provide professional corporations
some flexibility in offering employee stock option plans and pro-
* Partner, Williams Mullen, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1999, University of Richmond
School of Law; B.B.S., 1987, James Madison University.
* Associate, Williams Mullen, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2003, University of Richmond
School of Law; M.B.A., 2003, University of Richmond Graduate School of Business; B.A.,
1995, University of Virginia.
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vide clarification on the obligations of professionals to control pro-
fessional entities.
Section V addresses a handful of changes to the Virginia Act
that were designed to take into account the governance practices
of open-end investment companies registered under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (the "Investment Company Act") and
the updating amendment to the Virginia Securities Act (the "Se-
curities Act").
Finally, section VI reviews five cases since 2005 in which the
Supreme Court of Virginia addressed issues related to the law of
corporations and limited liability companies.
II. CERTAIN STATUTORY CHANGES RELATED TO CORPORATIONS
Since the sweeping amendments in 2005, the amendments to
the Virginia Act have been more targeted. Some of these targeted
changes have included amendments addressing mergers, share-
holder action without meetings, appraisal rights, the appoint-
ment of custodians or receivers for public corporations, house-
holding of notice to shareholders, and a limited expansion of the
ability to use objectively ascertainable facts in filings with the
Virginia State Corporation Commission (the "SCC"). In addition,
the General Assembly has passed multiple amendments to the
Nonstock Act to conform it to the 2005, 2006, and 2007 amend-
ments to the Virginia Act.
A. Mergers and Share Exchanges Under the Virginia Stock
Corporation Act
In the 2006 amendments to the Virginia Act, the General As-
sembly addressed when the shareholders of a surviving corpora-
tion must approve a merger. The amendments also eliminated
duplicative filing requirements for foreign corporations author-
ized to transact business in Virginia that merge with Virginia
corporations or eligible entities, and clarified that the articles of
incorporation of two or more merging domestic corporations must
be able to lawfully include the purposes of all of the merging cor-
porations. Additionally, the 2006 amendments created a provision
that allows existing corporations to establish holding companies.
Finally, the 2007 amendments simplified the approval process for
[Vol. 42:273
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a merger or share exchange involving a corporation that has not
yet issued stock.
Traditionally, the Virginia Act did not require the shareholders
of a surviving corporation in a merger to approve the merger
unless: (i) the articles of incorporation of the surviving corpora-
tion were to be amended in ways other than those described in
Virginia Code section 13.1-706; and (ii) the number of shares,
preferences, limitations, and rights of the pre-merger sharehold-
ers of the surviving corporation were to be changed by the
merger. Prior to 2005, the shareholders of a surviving corporation
were also required to approve a merger if the number of voting
shares outstanding increased by twenty percent or more as a re-
sult of the merger.' The 2005 amendments to the Virginia Act
eliminated this requirement. 2 In 2006, the General Assembly re-
stored the concept, but required shareholder approval if the
merger causes a twenty percent increase in the number of out-
standing shares that are eligible to vote for the election of direc-
tors as opposed to an increase in outstanding voting shares.3
Where a corporation is organized under the laws of another
state and applies for authority to transact business in Virginia, it
must file an application with the SCC for authority to transact
business. Along with its application, it must submit certified cop-
ies of its articles of incorporation as filed in the foreign corpora-
tion's state or other jurisdiction of incorporation, including all
amendments and mergers.4 To keep the SCC's records current, a
foreign corporation that engages in a merger is typically required
to file its articles of merger with the SCC within thirty days after
the merger becomes effective.5 Pursuant to the 2006 amendments
to the Virginia Act, a foreign corporation is no longer required to
file its articles of merger with the SCC where: (i) the foreign cor-
poration's articles of incorporation are not amended by virtue of
the merger; (ii) the merger involves a domestic corporation or eli-
gible entity (and thus the articles of merger are already filed with
the SCC on its behalf); and (iii) the articles of merger filed on be-
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(G)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
2. Act of Mar. 26, 2005, ch. 765, 2005 Va. Acts 1219 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(F) (Supp. 2007)).
3. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 663, 2006 Va. Acts 913 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-718(F)(4) (Supp. 2007)).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-759 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
5. Id. § 13.1-766.1 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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half of the domestic or eligible entity contain a statement that
"the merger is permitted under the laws of the state or other ju-
risdiction in which the foreign corporation is incorporated and
that the foreign corporation has complied with that law in effect-
ing the merger."6 A similar amendment was made to the Non-
stock Act.7
The 2006 amendments also make explicit a restriction on merg-
ing two domestic corporations that was previously implicit-one
or more domestic corporations may only merge "if the articles of
incorporation of each of them could lawfully contain all the corpo-
rate powers and purposes of all of them."' Thus, in addition to the
explicit prohibition against mergers between businesses author-
ized to engage in the special kinds of business listed in section
13.1-620 (insurance companies, banks, savings and loans, rail-
roads, and public service companies) and businesses that are not
authorized to engage in such business, mergers of corporations
that have special purposes and corporations that are not author-
ized to engage in such special business purpose are now also ex-
plicitly prohibited.9
Virginia Code section 13.1-719.1 was added in 2006 to allow an
existing corporation, defined as a "constituent corporation," to
place a holding company between itself and its shareholders
without the approval of the constituent corporation shareholders
and without the need to exchange share certificates. 10 To take
advantage of the statute, the previously existing or constituent
corporation forms a wholly owned subsidiary, referred to as the
"holding company."1 The holding company in turn forms a wholly
owned subsidiary, defined as the "indirect subsidiary." 12 See the
example included in Table 1.
6. Id. § 13.1-766.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
7. Id. § 13.1-928.1(A) (Supp. 2007).
8. Id. § 13.1-716(F)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
9. Id. § 13.1-716(F)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
10. Id. § 13.1-719.1(A) to -719.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
11. Id. § 13.1-719.1(A) (Rep]. Vol. 2006).
12. Id.
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The indirect subsidiary can then merge into the constituent
corporation with either the indirect subsidiary or the constituent
corporation to be the survivor if each share or fraction of a share
(or right to acquire a share) of the constituent corporation is con-
verted into a share (or right to acquire a share) of the holding
company having the same preferences, rights, and limitations as
the shares of the constituent corporation. 13
13. Id. § 13.1-719.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
Table 1
Immediately
Prior to Merger
20071
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The transaction can be completed without the approval of the
shareholders of the constituent corporation and without the ap-
proval of the shareholders or the board of directors of the indirect
subsidiary if shares (or rights to acquire shares) of the constitu-
ent corporation convert into shares (or rights to acquire shares) of
the holding company as described in the preceding paragraph.
Additionally, the following requirements must be met: (i) the con-
stituent corporation and the indirect subsidiary are the only par-
ties to the merger; (ii) the articles of incorporation and bylaws of
the constituent corporation and holding company are identical as
they relate to: (a) the designation, number, and par value of
shares that are authorized and the preferences, rights, and limi-
tations of each class and series of shares; (b) terms of the shares
that are dependent on objectively ascertainable facts; (c) preemp-
tive rights; (d) the definition, limitation, and regulation of the
powers of the corporation, and its directors and shareholders; and
(e) the management of the business and affairs of the corporation;
and (iii) the directors of the constituent corporation become or
remain the directors of the holding company upon the effective
Table 2
Immediately
After Merger Shareholders
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date of the merger. 4 Virginia Code section 13.1-719.1 also allows
a merger between the constituent corporation and the indirect
subsidiary without exchanging the share certificates of the con-
stituent corporation for certificates in the holding company, and
allows the plan of merger to include certain amendments to the
articles of incorporation of the surviving corporation. 5
The 2007 amendments to the Virginia Act allow the directors of
a corporation that has not issued shares of stock to adopt and ap-
prove a merger or share exchange without shareholder action
where such approval does not conflict with the corporation's arti-
cles of incorporation, even if the merger or share exchange would
typically require the approval of the corporation's shareholders.' 6
B. Action Without a Meeting of Shareholders
The General Assembly in 2007 made significant revisions to
Virginia Code section 13.1-657, which allows shareholder action
to be taken without a meeting. Formerly, the provision allowed
shareholder action to be taken without a meeting by unanimous
written consent, and in corporations other than public corpora-
tions, if the corporation's articles allowed for action by less than
unanimous written consent.17 Consents signed by the holders of
"not less than the minimum number of votes that would be re-
quired to authorize or take the action at a meeting at which all
share[holders] entitled to vote on the action were present and
voted" were also allowed." The 2007 amendments allow any Vir-
ginia corporation, including a public corporation, 1' to act by less
than unanimous written consent if its articles of incorporation al-
low action by less than unanimous written consent. 20 To allow for
a more certain determination of record dates for written consents,
if the record date is not otherwise fixed and board action must be
14. Id.
15. Id. § 13.1-719.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
16. Id. § 13.1-718(G) (Supp. 2007).
17. Id. § 13.1-657 (Supp. 2007).
18. Id.
19. Under the Virginia Act, a "public corporation" is "a corporation that has shares
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one
or more members of a national or affiliated securities association." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
603 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
20. Id. § 13.1-657(B) (Supp. 2007).
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taken, the record date is the close of business on the date board
action is taken. If no board action is required to be taken,21 the
record date is the date the first shareholder signs the consent.22
As in the past, action taken by written consent is still approved
when signed by shareholders having sufficient votes to take the
action; however, now a corporation may allow a delay for tabula-
tion in its articles or bylaws.23 A unanimous written consent can
specify the effective date of the consent if it also indicates the
date of execution by each consenting shareholder; 24 however, an
action by less than unanimous written consent or a consent to an
action requiring notice to non-voting shareholders under the Vir-
ginia Act cannot be effective sooner than fifteen days after writ-
ten consents sufficient to take the action have been delivered to
the corporation.25 Where notice of a proposed action is required to
be delivered to nonvoting shareholders and action is to be taken
by written consent, notice must be given to the nonvoting share-
holders not less than fifteen days before the effective date of the
action, and not more than ten days after the sufficient consents
have been received for the action to be approved.26 Similarly,
where an action is taken by less than unanimous written consent,
notice must be given to the nonconsenting shareholders not less
than fifteen days before the effective date of the action and not
more than ten days after sufficient consents have been received
for the action to be approved.2" In addition, the amendments al-
low for electronic transmission of written consents and provide
that delivery of a consent is effective if delivered to the corpora-
tion's registered agent at its registered office or the corporation's
secretary at its principal office. 2' Finally, the amendments pro-
vide that if a corporation's articles of incorporation provide for
21. Because shareholders have the ability to approve matters by unanimous consent
that otherwise might need to be submitted to directors, this may occur with some fre-
quency in Virginia corporations. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-685(F) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp.
2007).
22. Id. § 13.1-657(B) (Supp. 2007).
23. Id. § 13.1-657(D) (Supp. 2007).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 13.1-657(E) (Supp. 2007).
26. Id. § 13.1-657(F) (Supp. 2007).
27. Id. § 13.1-657(E) (Supp. 2007).
28. Id. § 13.1-657(G) to -657(H) (Supp. 2007).
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cumulative voting, directors cannot be elected by written consent
unless it is unanimous.29
C. Appraisal Rights
In its 2007 amendments to appraisal rights, the General As-
sembly primarily addressed the applicability of appraisal rights
to actions approved by written consent of a corporation's share-
holders, notice that accompanies appraisal rights, and the exclu-
sivity of the appraisal rights remedy.
At first glance, there appear to be a significant number of 2007
amendments to definitions in Virginia Code section 13.1-729 and
transactions triggering appraisal rights in section 13.1-730. Most
of the amendments, however, create "beneficial owner," "inter-
ested person," and "interested transaction" definitions by moving
language from section 13.1-730 to section 13.1-729.' 0 A slightly
different set of securities are now excluded from the appraisal
rights process. The first exclusion now includes any federally cov-
ered security under section 18(b)(1)(A) or (B) of the Securities Act
of 1933, as amended,31 which would include securities listed on
the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange,
Nasdaq, or securities registered on exchanges determined by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to have standards that are
substantially similar to the three exchanges.3 2 The second exclu-
sion, however, has been limited by the addition of the language
"[t]raded in an organized market."33 The revisions to section 13.1-
730 also provide some clarity for mutual funds organized in Vir-
ginia by specifically excluding from the appraisal rights process
shares issued by any "open end management investment com-
pany registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 [that] may be re-
deemed at the option of the holder at net asset value. 34
With respect to notice of appraisal rights, the amendments
comprehensively address transactions that are approved by
29. Id. § 13.1-669(E) (Supp. 2007).
30. Id. § 13.1-729 (Supp. 2007); id. § 13.1-730 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2000).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730(B)(1)(A) (Supp. 2007).
33. Id. § 13.1-730(B)(1)(b) (Supp. 2007).
34. Id. § 13.1-730(B)(1)(c) (Supp. 2007).
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unanimous or less than unanimous consent pursuant to Virginia
Code section 13.1-657. 35 Where a transaction triggering appraisal
rights is to be approved by unanimous consent and the corpora-
tion has concluded that appraisal rights are or may be available,
the corporation must include along with the consent solicitation a
written notice that appraisal rights are or may be available, a
copy of Article 15 of the Virginia Act, and the financial informa-
tion discussed in more detail in the next paragraph. 6 In addition,
notice of the transaction to nonconsenting and nonvoting share-
holders required under revised sections 13.1-657(E) and (F) must
be accompanied by notice that appraisal rights may be available,
Article 15, and the financial information discussed below.37 The
General Assembly also made a number of other minor changes
throughout Article 15 of the Virginia Act to address actions ap-
proved by less than unanimous written consent of the sharehold-
ers. 3
8
As mentioned above, the revisions include an explicit obligation
to include specific financial statements with the notice of ap-
praisal rights. 39 The financial statements may be consolidated,
and must be as of the fiscal year ended not more than sixteen
months prior to the date of the notice. 40 The financial statements
must include a balance sheet, income statement, and a statement
of changes in shareholders' equity, or if such statements are not
available, reasonably equivalent statements and the latest quar-
terly financial statements.41 Shareholders may waive their right
to receive financial statements, however, before or after the cor-
porate action.42
The exclusivity of the Article 15 appraisal rights remedy has
been modified by the deletion of former Virginia Code section
13.1-730(D) and the substitution of section 13.1-741.1. The new
provision is more specific in excluding remedies other than ap-
praisal rights. Now, a transaction listed in subsection A of section
35. Id. § 13.1-732(C) (Supp. 2007).
36. Id. § 13.1-732(C) to -732(D) (Supp. 2007).
37. Id.
38. See Act of Mar. 14, 2007, ch. 165, 2007 Va. Acts 232 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-733(B)(4), -741.1(B)(4) (Supp. 2007)).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-732(D) (Supp. 2007).
40. Id. § 13.1-732(D)(1) (Supp. 2007).
41. Id. § 13.1-732(D) (Supp. 2007).
42. Id. § 13.1-732(E) (Supp. 2007).
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13.1-730, in addition to not being able to be contested, cannot be
enjoined, set aside, or rescinded once it has been approved by the
shareholders of the corporation.4 3 Under the revised provision,
however, appraisal rights are not the exclusive remedy in several
situations. The first few relate to the manner in which the trans-
action was approved and are essentially unchanged. The ap-
praisal rights remedy is not exclusive if the transaction was not
approved in accordance with: (i) the applicable provisions of Arti-
cle 11 (Amendments to Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws), Ar-
ticle 12 (Merger and Share Exchange), or Article 13 (Disposition
of Assets); (ii) the corporation's articles of incorporation or by-
laws; or (iii) the resolution of the corporation's board of directors
authorizing the transaction.44 In addition, as before: (iv) appraisal
rights are not the exclusive remedy if the transaction was pro-
cured as a result of fraud or a material misrepresentation.45 Addi-
tional circumstances that make remedies other than appraisal
rights available are: (v) "omission[s] of material fact[s] necessary
to make statements made, in light of the circumstances in which
they are made, not misleading;" (vi) interested transactions
unless they are approved by disinterested directors or disinter-
ested shareholders; and (vii) actions approved by less than
unanimous written consent of the shareholders where the chal-
lenge is brought by a shareholder who did not consent, did not re-
ceive notice of the action at least fifteen days before it was ef-
fected, and brought a proceeding challenging the corporate action
within ten days after the shareholder in question receives notice
that the approval of the corporate action is effective. 46
D. Shareholder Right to Seek Judicial Dissolution for Public
Corporations; Custodian or Receiver for a Public Corporation
As of the 2007 amendments, a shareholder of a public corpora-
tion organized in Virginia can no longer seek judicial dissolution
unless the corporation has abandoned its business and has failed
within a reasonable time to liquidate and distribute its assets47 -
presumably a very rare situation. If a public corporation organ-
43. Id. § 13.1-741.1 (Supp. 2007).
44. Id. § 13.1-741.1(A)(1) (Supp. 2007).
45. Id. § 13.1-741.1(A)(2) (Supp. 2007).
46. Id. § 13.1-741.1(B) (Supp. 2007).
47. Id. § 13.1-747(A) (Supp. 2007).
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ized in Virginia has not abandoned its business, a shareholder
may only request that a custodian or receiver be appointed for the
corporation and then only if:
[tihe directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate af-
fairs, the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irrepa-
rable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered; or [I
[tihe directors or those in control of the corporation are acting
fraudulently and irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened
or being suffered.48
When such an action is initiated, the court has the authority to
issue injunctions, appoint a temporary receiver or custodian, and
take other actions to preserve the corporation's assets and carry
on its business prior to a full hearing.49 Otherwise, the powers of
the court and of the receiver or custodian are nearly identical to
those given under the judicial dissolution provisions of the Vir-
ginia Act.5 °
E. Householding of Notice
By adding section 13.1-610.1 to the Code of Virginia, the Gen-
eral Assembly has specifically authorized "householding" notices
sent to a corporation's shareholders.5 Under the new provisions,
notice is deemed delivered to all shareholders who share a com-
mon address if the corporation addresses the notice to each
shareholder individually, to all of the shareholders as a group, or
in some other manner to which the shareholders have consented,
and if each of the shareholders has given their express or implied
consent to such notice.52 Consent may be implied if a shareholder
fails to object to receiving a household notice within sixty days of
the corporation notifying the shareholder of its intention to begin
sending household notices.5 3 A shareholder can revoke consent to
this form of notice at any time and the corporation must begin
48. Id. § 13.1-672.6(A) (Supp. 2007).
49. Id. § 13.1-672.6(B)(1) (Supp. 2007).
50. Id. § 13.1-748 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
51. Act of Mar. 9, 2007, ch. 165, 2007 Va. Acts 232 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-610.1 (Supp. 2007)).
52. Id. § 13.1-610.1(A) (Supp. 2007).
53. Id. § 13.1-610.1(B) (Supp. 2007).
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providing individual notices within thirty days of such revoca-
tion. 4
F. Objectively Ascertainable Facts
Continuing the pattern started by the adoption of section 13.1-
604(L) in 2005, the General Assembly has specifically included in
the 2007 amendments that provisions in restated articles of in-
corporation implementing exchanges, reclassifications, or cancel-
lations of issued shares may be made dependent upon facts objec-
tively ascertainable outside the articles of restatement."5
G. Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act
In the 2007 session, extensive revisions were made to the Non-
stock Act to conform it with the 2005 amendments to the Virginia
Act. Highlights include: (i) the addition of section 13.1-804(L) to
the Nonstock Act, which allows the terms of filings to be depend-
ent on objectively ascertainable facts; 56 (ii) the defining of "disin-
terested director" in section 13.1-803, which is now more similar
to its analog under the Virginia Act;57 (iii) the permittence of ac-
tions in a nonstock corporation to be taken electronically in a way
similar to actions allowed in an electronic medium in a stock cor-
poration;58 (iv) the allowance of less than unanimous consents in
writing of members in nonstock corporations;59 (v) the providence
for voting procedures and inspectors of elections;6 ° (vi) the crea-
tion of a safe harbor for a director of a nonstock corporation to
now benefit from exploiting business opportunities;61 (vii) the sig-
nificant revision of the provisions applicable to mergers with non-
stock corporations to now allow for combinations between non-
stock corporations and eligible entities;62 and (viii) the creation of
54. Id. § 13.1-610.1(C) (Supp. 2007).
55. Act of Mar. 14, 2007, ch. 165, 2007 Va. Acts 232 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
711(D)(4) (Supp. 2007)).
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-804(L) (Supp. 2007).
57. Id. § 13.1-803 (Supp. 2007).
58. Id. § 13.1-810(H) (Supp. 2007).
59. Id. § 13.1-841 (Supp. 2007).
60. Id. § 13.1-847.1 (Supp. 2007).
61. Id. § 13.1-893.1 to -897.1 (Supp. 2007).
62. Id. § 13.1-894(A) (Supp. 2007).
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provisions to deal with contingent and unknown claims against a
dissolved nonstock corporation.63
III. CERTAIN STATUTORY CHANGES RELATED TO LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
Virginia's legislators have continued to modify the statutes re-
lated to entities other than stock and nonstock corporations with
amendments to the LLC Act and the Virginia RULPA. These
amendments focused on conforming the Acts' language and sub-
stantive provisions to similar provisions under the Virginia Act
with a few amendments that address issues unique to limited li-
ability companies or limited partnerships. Amendments related
to domestication of foreign limited liability companies, the defini-
tion of limited liability company membership interests, the
method of approving amendments to limited liability company ar-
ticles of organization, methods to eliminate or minimize contin-
gent liabilities for dissolved limited liability companies and lim-
ited partnerships, and other changes to the limited partnership
statute were made.
A. Domestication of Foreign Limited Liability Companies
In 2006, the General Assembly added domestication provisions
to the LLC Act 64 similar to the provisions added to the Virginia
Act in 2001.65
A foreign limited liability company may domesticate into a Vir-
ginia domestic limited liability company, and a domestic limited
liability company may domesticate into a foreign limited liability
company, if the limited liability company is not required by law to
be a domestic limited liability company, and if the laws of the ju-
risdiction in which the company intends to domesticate allow for
domestication.66 Unlike under the Virginia Act, there is no ex-
plicit requirement that the jurisdiction in which a foreign limited
liability company is formed allow for domestication where a for-
63. Id. § 13.1-908.1 to -908.3 (Supp. 2007).
64. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 912, 2006 Va. Acts 1563 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1074 to -1080 (Repl. Vol. 2006)).
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-722.2 to -722.7 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
66. Id. § 13.1-1074(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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eign limited liability company intends to domesticate in Vir-
ginia.6 7 The domestication must be approved, however, in the
manner required by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the lim-
ited liability company is organized.6" Presumably, there would be
no manner to approve domestication in jurisdictions where do-
mestication is not available. Generally, a plan of domestication
must be approved as provided in the limited liability company's
articles of organization or operating agreement or, if the articles
of organization and operating agreement are silent on domestica-
tion, by the members in the same manner as amendments to the
operating agreement.69
The LLC Act's domestication provision allows for a simpler
plan of domestication that only needs to state the jurisdiction
where the limited liability company is presently domesticated and
the jurisdiction where the limited liability company is to be do-
mesticated. 7' The plan of domestication may also include as an
attachment the articles of organization of the limited liability
company upon its domestication and any other provisions relating
to the domestication.71 Although for a foreign limited liability
company domesticating into Virginia, when articles of domestica-
tion are filed, new Virginia articles of organization must be in-
cluded as an attachment to the plan of domestication.72
The provisions related to submitting articles of domestication
are very similar to the provisions under the Virginia Act.73 The
articles must include the name of the foreign limited liability
company and any new name if its name is unavailable or if a new
name is desired, its plan of domestication, and, as previously
stated, its new articles of organization. 74 Articles of surrender for
limited liability companies are simpler than for corporations as
they do not need to state the manner of approval.75
67. Compare id. § 13.1-722.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006), with id. § 13.1-1074(A) (Repl. Vol.
2006).
68. Id. § 13.1-1077(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
69. Id. § 13.1-1076(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
70. Id. § 13.1-1075(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
71. Id. § 13.1-1075(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
72. Id. § 13.1-1077(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
73. Compare id. § 13.1-1077 (Repl. Vol. 2006), with id. § 13.1-722.4 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
74. Id. § 13.1-1077(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
75. Compare id. § 13.1-1078 (Repl. Vol. 2006), with id. § 13.1-722.5 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
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The effect of a foreign limited liability company's domestication
into Virginia is virtually identical to its analog under the Virginia
Act.76 While the limited liability company is new to Virginia, it
has continuity of existence,7 7 is considered to be the same limited
liability company as it was prior to domestication,78 continues to
hold title to all of its properties, 79 remains subject to all of its li-
abilities and any suits pending against it, ° and its members re-
main subject to any liabilities of the limited liability company for
which they were previously liable."
B. Definition of Membership Interest Under Limited Liability
Company Act
An interesting change in 2007 is the amended definition of
"membership interest" in the LLC Act. Previously, the definition
was: "'Membership interest' or 'interest' means, except as other-
wise provided in the articles of organization or an operating
agreement, a member's share of the profits and the losses of the
limited liability company and the right to receive distributions of
the limited liability company's assets." 2 In 2007, the phrase "ex-
cept as otherwise provided in the articles of organization or an
operating agreement" was deleted. It appears that the intention
was to clarify that the right to share in distributions, profits, and
losses is the essential element in every membership interest,84
and that this element of a membership interest cannot be altered
in the articles or operating agreement of a limited liability com-
pany. This revision should not be construed as restricting a mem-
bership interest only to those rights, since obviously, a member-
ship interest can include voting or management rights, and it
should not be construed as restricting a limited liability company
from creating classes of membership interests that have differing
76. Compare id. § 13.1-1079 (Repl. Vol. 2006), with id. § 13.1-722.6 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
77. Id. § 13.1-1079(A)(5)(b) to -1079(A)(5)(c) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
78. Id. § 13.1-1079(A)(5)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
79. Id. § 13.1-1079(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
80. Id. § 13.1-1079(A)(2) to -1079(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
81. Id. § 13.1-1079(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
82. Id. § 13.1-1002 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
83. Id. § 13.1-1002 (Supp. 2007).
84. See id. § 13.1-1039(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006) (regarding the right of even an assignee
who has not been admitted as a member to share in the distributions, profits, and losses of
his predecessor in interest).
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or preferred rights to distributions, profits, and losses, as long as
each member has some right to distributions, profits, and losses.
C. Amendment to Limited Liability Company Articles of
Organization
In the 2006 session, the General Assembly included a change to
the procedure for approving an amendment to a limited liability
company's articles of organization. 5 Now an amendment of the
articles of organization is no longer effective upon approval by a
majority of members if the articles of organization and operating
agreement are silent on the issue. Instead, an amendment is ap-
proved in the same way an amendment to the operating agree-
ment is approved.16 While minor looking, this amendment could
change the vote required to amend articles of organization for
many limited liability companies.
D. Disposition of Contingent or Unknown Claims Against a
Limited Liability Company or Limited Partnership in
Dissolution
In the 2006 amendments to the LLC Act and the Virginia
RULPA, the General Assembly included provisions that allow
limited liability companies and limited partnerships in dissolu-
tion options for the disposition of contingent and unknown claims
similar to those available to stock corporations.8 7 The new provi-
sions allow for a dissolved limited liability company or limited
partnership to publish a notice of its dissolution that includes a
request that persons with claims present them to the dissolved
entity. 8 The notice must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or county where the principal office or, if
none, the registered office of the dissolved limited liability com-
pany or limited partnership was last located. 9 The notice must
85. Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 912, 2006 Va. Acts 1563 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1014 (Repl. Vol. 2006)).
86. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1014(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
87. Compare Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 912, 2006 Va. Acts 1563 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 13.1-1049.2 to -1049.3, 50-73.52:2 to -73.52:3 (Repl. Vol. 2006)), with VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-746.1 to -746.2 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006); id. § 50-73.52:2(A) (Repl. Vol.
2005).
89. Id. § 13.1-1049.2(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2006); id. § 50-73.52:2(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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also describe what information a claimant must include in their
claim and state that the claim will be barred unless asserted
prior to the earlier of the expiration of any applicable statute of
limitations or three years after the publication of the notice.9" If a
dissolving limited liability company or limited partnership follows
this procedure and a claim is not asserted prior to the earlier of
the expiration of any applicable statute of limitations or three
years after the publication of the notice, claims for which the
claimant did not receive the known claims notice under Virginia
Code section 13.1-1049.1 or section 50-73.52:1, contingent claims
that the entity is aware of but that have not been asserted in
court, a contingent liability or claim based on an event occurring
after the date of dissolution, and a liability or claim the ultimate
maturity of which is more than sixty days after the delivery of
written notice to the claimant, will each be barred.91
Further, if a dissolved limited liability company or limited
partnership has followed the notice process described above, it
may at any time initiate a proceeding in the circuit court where
the dissolved entity's principal office, or if none, its registered of-
fice, was last located to determine the amount of security to be
posted for claims that would be barred under Virginia Code sec-
tion 13.1-1049.2(C) or section 50-73.52:2(C).9 2 Within ten days af-
ter filing its application, the limited liability company or limited
partnership must provide notice to each claimant holding a con-
tingent claim that is shown on the records of the dissolved en-
tity.93 The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
unknown claimants.94 The court's determination of security nec-
90. Id. § 13.1-1049.2(B)(2) to -1049.2(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-
73.52:2(B)(2) to -73.52:2(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.52:2(C)
(Repl. Vol. 2005). The mechanics of Virginia Code section 13.1-1049.2(C)(3) and section 50-
73.52:2(C)(3), however, are a bit awkward. The reference to a definition of "claim" is odd
because the provision referenced is not a definition of "claim" but instead excludes certain
matters from the definition of "claim." The intention of this mechanism is to bar claims
that are: (i) a contingent liability or claim based on an event occurring after the date of
dissolution; or (ii) a liability or claim the ultimate maturity of which is more than sixty
days after the delivery of written notice to the claimant. See e.g., id. § 13.1-746.1(C)(3)
(Repl. Vol. 2006).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.52:3(A)
(Repl. Vol. 2005).
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.52:3(B)
(Repl. Vol. 2005).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049.3(C) (Repl. Vol. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.52:3(C)
(Repl. Vol. 2005).
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essary to be posted for such claims shall be the dissolved limited
liability company or limited partnership's only obligation, and if
an entity follows this procedure, a contingent liability or claim
based on an event occurring after the date of dissolution and a li-
ability or claim the ultimate maturity of which is more than sixty
days after the delivery of written notice to the claimant may not
be pursued against the dissolving entity's former members or
partners. 95 Persons holding "known claims" entitled to notice un-
der Virginia Code section 13.1-1049.1 or section 50-73.52:1 whose
claims are not barred under section 13.1-1049.1(C) or 50-
73.52:1(C), however, may proceed against former members or
partners.96 Thus, a limited liability company or limited partner-
ship that intends to dissolve may provide its members or part-
ners, respectively, a great deal of protection from contingent li-
abilities by following this claims process.
E. Certain Statutory Changes Related to Limited Partnerships
In the 2007 session, the General Assembly did some house-
keeping within the Virginia RULPA by, among other things: (i)
specifying that foreign limited partnerships must register in Vir-
ginia to conduct business; (ii) allowing a limited partnership to be
the survivor of a merger with a corporation, limited liability com-
pany, or business trust; and (iii) providing a method for a general
partnership to convert to a limited partnership. 9" Additionally, an
entity that transacts business in Virginia as a limited partner-
ship without registering either as a domestic or foreign limited
partnership has committed a Class 1 misdemeanor.9"
Prior to 2007, Virginia Code section 50-73.48:1 included among
its requirements for a merger involving a Virginia limited part-
nership the following limitation: "In the case of a merger of a lim-
ited partnership to which one or more domestic or foreign corpo-
rations are parties, a domestic or foreign corporation, limited
liability company or business trust party to the merger is the sur-
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049.3(C) to -1049.3(D) (Repl. Vol. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. §
50-73.52:3(D) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1049.3(D) (Repl. Vol. 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73.52:3(D)
(Repl. Vol. 2005).
97. See Act of Mar. 20, 2007, ch. 631, 2007 Va. Acts 941 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of VA. CODE ANN. § 50-73 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 50.1-73.10:1 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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viving entity of the merger."99 The 2007 amendments removed
this limitation. A limited partnership may now be the survivor of
a merger with a domestic or foreign corporation, limited liability
company, or business trust. 100
The 2007 amendments to the Virginia RULPA allow a domestic
or foreign general partnership to convert to a Virginia limited
partnership in much the same way that a domestic or foreign
partnership may convert to a limited liability company under the
LLC Act.' The general partnership must approve the conversion
in the manner specified in its partnership agreement, or if no
method of approval is specified, the conversion must be approved
by all of the partners. 102 The converting general partnership must
file a certificate of limited partnership that satisfies the name,
registered agent, principal office, and general partner information
required under Virginia Code section 50-73.11 and includes: (i)
the name of the general partnership and any identification num-
ber issued to it by the SCC; (ii) the jurisdiction where the general
partnership was formed; (iii) if the partnership was a registered
limited liability partnership, a statement to that effect; and (iv) a
statement confirming that the conversion was approved in the
manner described in section 50-73.11:3(B).'° 3 When a domestic or
foreign general partnership converts into a Virginia limited part-
nership, it is considered to be the same entity as it was prior to
conversion, continues to hold title to all of its properties, and re-
mains subject to all of its liabilities and any suits pending against
it.' 04 If the converted entity was previously registered as a limited
liability partnership, the effective date of its organization shall
continue to be the date it was registered as a registered limited
liability partnership. 1 5 General partners who become limited
partners as a result of the conversion remain liable as general
partners for obligations that were incurred prior to the conversion
becoming effective.' 06
99. Id. § 50-73.48:1 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
100. Id. § 50-73.48:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
101. Compare id. § 50-73.11:3 (Cum. Supp. 2007), with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1010.1
(Repl. Vol. 2006).
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 50.1-73.11:3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
103. Id. § 50.1-73.11:3(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
104. Id. § 50.1-73.11:4(A) to -73.11:4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
105. Id. § 50.1-73.11:4(D) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
106. Id. § 50.1-73.11:4(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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IV. CERTAIN STATUTORY CHANGES RELATED TO PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES
A. Professional Corporations and Employee Stock Option Plans
By enacting HB 952 during the 2006 session, the General As-
sembly authorized professional corporations to keep and maintain
"eligible employee stock option plans."10 7 An "eligible employee
stock option plan" must be an employee stock ownership plan as
defined in section 4975(e)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.' In addition, unless there is a conflict of in-
terest, all trustees of the employee stock option plan must be "in-
dividuals who are duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to
render the professional services for which the professional corpo-
ration is organized."' 9 Where a conflict exists, a special inde-
pendent trustee may be engaged to make a decision with respect
to the conflict. 110 An eligible employee stock option plan must also
provide that no rights under the plan are available to any person
other than an "individual duly licensed or otherwise legally au-
thorized to render the professional services for which the profes-
sional corporation is organized," unless the shares are transferred
to "a plan beneficiary and subject to immediate repurchase by the
professional corporation, the employee stock ownership plan or
another person authorized to hold such shares.""' For profes-
sional corporations engaged in the business of certified public ac-
counting, at least fifty-one percent of the professional corpora-
tion's stock must be held by the plan for the benefit of licensed
certified public accountants or be held directly by licensed certi-
fied public accountants." 2 For professional corporations providing
the professional services of architects, professional engineers,
land surveyors, certified landscape architects, or certified interior
designers, at least two-thirds of the professional corporation's
107. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 672, 2006 Va. Acts 926 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of VA. CODE ANN.).
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-543(A) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
109. Id. § 13.1-543(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 13.1-543(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
112. Id. § 13.1-543(A)(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
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stock must be held by the plan for the benefit of licensed persons
or be held directly by licensed persons.'13
B. Professional Corporations and Supervision of Individuals
Licensed to Provide Professional Services
In the 2006 session, the General Assembly clarified whether
even if a professional corporation's board of directors is elimi-
nated by virtue of a shareholder agreement or otherwise, only in-
dividuals who are employed by the corporation and licensed and
legally authorized to render the professional services that the
corporation provides shall supervise and direct the provision of
professional services." 4 In the case of professional corporations
rendering architect, engineering, landscape architect, or land
surveyor services that only need to be two-thirds owned by such
professionals, at least two-thirds of the individuals providing su-
pervision and direction must be employees of the corporation and
legally authorized to use the professional title.115
C. Professional Corporation and Limited Liability Company
Board and Managers'Authority to Delegate to Agents
Although the 2006 amendment placed the accountability for
management on the licensed professionals whether they keep the
board structure or eliminate it, the 2007 amendment appears to
clarify that, although responsibility remains with the licensed
professionals, the licensed professionals may delegate managerial
duties and tasks related to the company's operations.'16
V. CERTAIN STATUTORY CHANGES RELATED TO INVESTMENT
COMPANIES AND THE SECURITIES ACT
In addition to being excluded from the appraisal rights proc-
ess, 117 the 2006 amendments include four changes that allow a
Virginia corporation registered as an open-end investment com-
113. Id. § 13.1-543(A)(2)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
114. Act of Apr. 5, 2006, ch. 649, 2006 Va. Acts 876 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-553 (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007)).
115. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-553 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
116. Id. §§ 13.1-553, -1118 (Supp. 2007).
117. See supra Part II.C.
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pany under the Investment Company Act of 1940 to manage itself
in a way that is consistent with the rules and regulations prom-
ulgated under the Investment Company Act." 8 The board of di-
rectors of an open-end investment company without the need for
any shareholder action may:
[cilassify any unissued shares into one or more classes or into one or
more series within one or more classes; [rieclassify any unissued
shares of any class into one or more classes or into one or more series
within one or more classes; or [rjeclassify any unissued shares of any
series of any class into one or more classes or into one or more series
within one or more classes.
1 19
In addition, the 2006 amendments exempt a corporation regis-
tered as an open-end investment company from the provisions
that limit the authority of a corporation's board of directors to in-
crease or decrease the number of directors. 20 Members of the
board of directors of a Virginia corporation registered as an open-
end management investment company under the Investment
Company Act are deemed disinterested and independent for pur-
poses of the Virginia Act if they are not interested persons as de-
fined in the Investment Company Act. 12 Finally, the board of di-
rectors of a Virginia corporation registered as an open-end
management company under the Investment Company Act may,
without shareholder action, increase or decrease the aggregate
number of shares or classes or series of shares unless the articles
of incorporation provide otherwise. 1
22
A couple of interesting amendments were made to the Securi-
ties Act in the 2007 session. Virginia Code Section 13.1-514(B)
lists certain transactions that are exempt from the securities,
broker-dealer, and agent registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act.' 23 The Securities Act is based on the Uniform Securities
Act of 1956 and Virginia Code section 13.1-514(B)(9) is modeled
after section 402(b)(12) of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.124
Section 13.1-514(B)(9) prior to the amendments exempted:
118. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -52 (2006).
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-639(D) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
120. Id. § 13.1-675(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
121. Id. § 13.1-690.1 (Repl. Vol. 2006).
122. Id. § 13.1-706(7) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
123. Id. § 13.1-514(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
124. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(12) (amended 1958, withdrawn 1985), 7C U.L.A. 848
(2006 & Supp. 2007).
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[any offer (but not a sale) of a security for which registration state-
ments have been filed under both this chapter and the Securities Act
of 1933; but this exemption shall not apply while a stop order is in ef-
fect or, after notice to the issuer, while a proceeding or examination
looking toward such an order is pending under either act. 125
The intent under both the Securities Act and the Uniform Securi-
ties Act of 1956 was for this exemption only to apply during the
period between a filing of a registration statement with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission and its effectiveness. When the
Uniform Securities Act of 1956 was revised in 1985 and 2002, this
problem was corrected. 126 Since Virginia has stood by the 1956
Uniform Securities Act, however, the ambiguity persisted until
this year's amendment which clarified that this transactional ex-
emption is only applicable until the registration statement be-
comes effective. 127 In addition, the amendments allowing the SCC
to promulgate rules allowing an "agent" of a broker-dealer to be
employed by more than one broker-dealer or issuer is another in-
stance where Virginia is selectively implementing some of the
concepts in the 1985 and 2002 revisions in the Uniform Securities
Act of 1956.128
VI. SELECTED CASES AFFECTING CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
Since 2005, the Supreme Court of Virginia has issued a num-
ber of rulings that touched on corporations and limited liability
companies. Two cases addressed the court's stance on the en-
forceability of shareholder agreements. In these cases, the court
discussed an officer's ability to bind a corporation to an agree-
ment to sell substantially all of its assets, the corporate opportu-
nity doctrine, and the fiduciary duties owed by a manager to a
limited liability company.
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(9) (Supp. 2007).
126. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(16) (amended 1988); 7C U.L.A. 278 (2006); UNIF. SEC.
ACT § 202(16), 7C U.L.A. 60 (2006).
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(9) (Supp. 2007).
128. Id. § 13.1-504(B) (Supp. 2007); see also UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(e) (2002); UNIF. SEC.
ACT § 208(d) (amended 1988), 7C U.L.A. 240 (2006).
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A. Shareholder Agreements
In Hamlet v. Hayes, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld and
specifically enforced the provisions of a shareholder agreement
that gave a corporation and its shareholders a right of first re-
fusal in the event a shareholder desired to sell his shares to a
third party at the third party's offering price but on payment
terms contained in the shareholder agreement.129
Valerie Hamlet, Raymond Miler, and Jane Perry were share-
holders in Commonwealth Wood Preservers, Inc. along with
Jackie L. Hayes and Millard Davis. 3 ° The shareholders and the
corporation had entered into a shareholder agreement dated
January 2, 1990."' The agreement provided that if a shareholder
desired to sell his or her shares, the shareholder must first offer
those shares to the corporation." 2 If the corporation declined to
purchase, the remaining shareholders also had a right of first re-
fusal.'33
In 2004, Millard Davis offered to purchase all of Hayes's shares
for a purchase price of $700,000. 134 Mr. Hayes then offered those
shares to the corporation, but the corporation declined to exercise
its first refusal right and notified the remaining shareholders of
their first refusal right.135 In accordance with the shareholder
agreement, Hamlet, Miller, and Perry notified the corporation
that they intended to exercise their first refusal right. 136 Thereaf-
ter, Davis rescinded his offer to purchase Hayes's shares, and
Hayes attempted to rescind his offer to sell his shares to the cor-
poration and the remaining shareholders pursuant to the share-
holder agreement. 1
7
Hamlet, Miller, and Perry filed a bill of complaint alleging
breach of contract and requesting specific performance against
Hayes and the corporation. 13 Hayes and the corporation filed a
129. Hamlet v. Hayes, 273 Va. 437, 442-44, 641 S.E.2d 115, 118-19 (2007).
130. Id. at 439, 441, 641 S.E.2d at 116-17.
131. Id. at 439, 641 S.E.2d at 116.
132. Id. at 439-40, 641 S.E.2d at 116.
133. Id. at 440, 641 S.E.2d at 116.
134. Id. at 441, 641 S.E.2d at 117.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 441-42, 641 S.E.2d at 117-18.
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demurrer stating that Hamlet, Miller, and Perry had failed to al-
lege the essential elements of a breach of contract that would en-
title them to specific performance. The trial court sustained the
demurrer.'39 The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de
novo and found that when Hayes notified the corporation of his
first refusal right, as was his duty under the shareholder agree-
ment, it constituted an offer to sell. 140 The court further found
Hamlet, Miller, and Perry's indication to the corporation that
they desired to purchase Hayes's shares constituted an accep-
tance, and the provisions in the shareholder agreement that al-
lowed for the purchasing shareholders to buy the offered shares
at the same purchase price but on different payment terms-
instead of all cash at closing, twenty percent cash at closing and
eighty percent via a negotiable promissory note-was enforce-
able.44 The court also found that the shareholder agreement in-
cluded covenants allowing specific performance, but even if it had
not, specific performance was the proper remedy because the
shares were unique personal property and there was no adequate
remedy at law. 142
In Barber v. VistaRMS, Inc., the Supreme Court of Virginia did
not address Virginia Code section 13.1-671.1, which deals with
shareholder agreements, but it did uphold an agreement to trans-
fer stock upon termination of employment that is of the type com-
monly used by closely held Virginia corporations in shareholder
agreements. 143 Barber was an employee of VistaRMS, a corpora-
tion owned by three original shareholders and four employees.'
The original shareholders had signed an agreement on December
22, 1998, which provided that if an employee should "leave the
employment of [VistaRMS] for any reason-either voluntarily, by
termination of employment or death-[his] ownership of the com-
mon stock . . . shall immediately cease." 45 After the original
shareholders agreed to issue Barber shares in connection with his
employment, Barber signed an addendum to the 1998 agreement
139. Id. at 439, 641 S.E.2d at 116.
140. Id. at 439, 442, 641 S.E.2d at 116, 118.
141. Id. at 442-43, 641 S.E.2d at 118.
142. Id. at 443, 641 S.E.2d at 118.
143. See 272 Va. 319, 332-33, 634 S.E.2d 706, 714 (2006).
144. Id. at 323, 634 S.E.2d at 709.
145. Id. at 323-24, 634 S.E.2d at 709.
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each time he received shares in 1999 and 2002.146 The addenda
expressly stated that if Barber left employment of the corpora-
tion, his ownership of the stock would immediately cease. 14 7 Bar-
ber's employment was suddenly terminated on January 15, 2004,
and Barber signed a separation agreement that terminated all of
his rights to "future compensation, bonuses, savings plans, stocks
and stock options." 14 The corporation failed to request, however,
that Barber return his stock certificates or note that the certifi-
cates had been cancelled in the corporation's books and records. 141
In December 2004, upon learning that the corporation was in dis-
cussions with a potential buyer, Barber sought access to corporate
records. 5 ° The corporation refused access, and Barber filed a pe-
tition for writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of Fairfax
County seeking an order to require that the corporation provide
him access to its books and records, provide him notice of his dis-
senting rights, and be prohibited from distributing the corpora-
tion's assets to the shareholders. 151
VistaRMS filed and was granted a demurrer, and Barber ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 15 2 Barber asserted that
he was a shareholder during the period in question because he
held the shares of stock and was listed as a shareholder in the
corporation's records. 15 3 He argued that the 1998 agreement and
the 1999 and 2002 addenda did not address how the shares would
be transferred back to the corporation, and that the share certifi-
cates themselves stated they could only be transferred by the
holder or his attorney in fact. 5 4 He further asserted that the cor-
poration's release of Barber surrendered any claims it may have
had to the stock, and because Barber did not "deliver" the shares,
no transfer occurred under Article 8 of Virginia's Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 15 Barber also claimed that the transfer created
preferences, limitations, and rights not stated in the articles of
146. Id. at 324, 634 S.E.2d at 709.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 325, 634 S.E.2d at 709-10.
149. Id. at 325-26, 634 S.E.2d at 710.
150. Id. at 326, 634 S.E.2d at 710.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 326-27, 634 S.E.2d at 711.
153. Id. at 328, 634 S.E.2d at 711.
154. Id. at 330, 634 S.E.2d at 712-13.
155. Id. at 330-31, 634 S.E.2d at 713.
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
incorporation in violation of Virginia Code section 13.1-638(A). 156
Finally, he asserted that the 1999 and 2002 addenda were
against public policy, and that the 1998 agreement and the ad-
denda did not constitute a shareholder agreement under Virginia
Code section 13.1-671.1.'
On Barber's appeal of the demurrer, the court reviewed
whether the trial court ruled correctly that Barber was not a
shareholder based on the facts asserted in his pleading. 5 ' The
court found the parties had agreed that the shares would be sur-
rendered without further action by the corporation immediately
upon termination of Barber's employment, and the boilerplate in
the stock certificates did not negate the parties agreement in this
regard.'59 The court held this transfer did not involve a purchase
and sale of stock, and therefore Article 8 did not apply. 6 ° It also
found section 13.1-638(A) was not violated by the corporation be-
cause Barber had the same rights as all other shareholders dur-
ing the term of his employment. 161 The court held that provisions
such as those in the corporation agreement may be necessary to
keep a corporation closely held, and therefore do not violate pub-
lic policy.'62 Finally, the court declined to address Barber's asser-
tion that the 1998 agreement and addenda did not constitute
shareholder agreements under section 13.1-671.1 because "[t]he
sole impact of such a determination ... would be to subject these
agreements to the statutory provisions previously addressed" by
the court's findings.'63
B. Authority of Officer to Bind Corporation to Sale of
Substantially All Assets
In WBM, LLC v. Wildwoods Holding Corp., the Supreme Court
of Virginia addressed the concept of the sale of substantially all
corporate assets under the Virginia Act prior to the 2005 amend-
156. Id. at 331, 634 S.E.2d at 713.
157. Id. at 331-32, 634 S.E.2d at 713-14.
158. Id. at 323, 634 S.E.2d at 708.
159. Id. at 330, 634 S.E.2d at 713.
160. Id. at 331, 634 S.E.2d at 713.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 332, 634 S.E.2d at 714.
163. Id.
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ments. 64 Virginia Code section 13.1-724(A) previously allowed a
corporation to:
sell, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of all, or substantially all,
of its property, otherwise than in the usual and regular course of
business, on the terms and conditions and for the consideration de-
termined by the corporation's board of directors, if the board of direc-
tors adopts and its shareholders approve the proposed transac-
tion. 1
6 5
At issue was whether a contract for the sale of real estate that
was signed by the President of Wildwoods Holding Corporation
("Wildwoods"), but was approved by its board of directors or
shareholders could be specifically enforced against the corpora-
tion. '66
Wildwoods had existed since 1971 and had held twenty-three
lots since its initial incorporation as its sole asset. 16' Gerald
Chaplain, as President of Wildwoods, allegedly signed a contract
to sell these twenty-three lots to Edward Chaplain. 16  Subse-
164. 270 Va. 156, 613 S.E.2d 402 (2005).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-724(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999). In 2005, section 13.1-724(A) was
amended to address some of the ambiguities in what exactly constitutes a sale of substan-
tially all corporate assets. The pertinent section now reads:
A. A sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of the corporation's assets,
other than a disposition described in § 13.1-723, requires approval of the cor-
poration's shareholders if the disposition would leave the corporation without
a significant continuing business activity. Unless the articles of incorporation
or a shareholder-approved bylaw otherwise provide, if a corporation retains a
business activity that represented at least 20 percent of total assets at the
end of the most recently completed fiscal year, and 20 percent of either (i) in-
come from continuing operations before taxes or (ii) revenues from continuing
operations for that fiscal year, in each case of the corporation and any of its
subsidiaries that are consolidated for purposes of federal income taxes, the
corporation will conclusively be deemed to have retained a significant con-
tinuing business activity.
B. A disposition that requires approval of the shareholders under subsection
A shall be initiated by adoption of a resolution by the board of directors au-
thorizing the disposition. After adoption of such a resolution, the board of di-
rectors shall submit the proposed disposition to the shareholders for their ap-
proval. The board of directors shall also submit to the shareholders a
recommendation that the shareholders approve the proposed disposition,
unless the board of directors makes a determination that because of conflicts
of interest or other special circumstances it should not make such a recom-
mendation, in which case the board of directors shall transmit to the share-
holders the basis for that determination.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-724(A) to -724(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006 & Supp. 2007).
166. WBM, LLC, 270 Va. at 159-60, 613 S.E.2d at 404. Damages were not addressed.
167. Id. at 159, 613 S.E.2d at 404.
168. Id. at 159-60, 613 S.E.2d at 404.
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quently, Gerald denied signing the contract and Wildwoods re-
fused to convey the property in question to WBM, which had been
formed by Edward and others and assigned Edward's purchase
rights under the contract.'69 WBM brought an action to specifi-
cally enforce the contract, but the chancery court declined to do so
because Gerald Chaplain was not authorized to sign the contract
by Wildwoods's board of directors and shareholders. 1
70
In affirming the chancellor's decision, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that although Wildwoods's charter provided that it
was in the business of selling land, it had never sold any land, the
twenty-three lots in question constituted substantially all of the
corporation's assets, and sale of these assets required approval of
the corporation's board of directors and shareholders. 17' Because
there was no formal corporate action showing approval or any
evidence that all of the directors and shareholders had knowledge
of the contract and had acquiesced to Gerald's action, the court
held that the contract was not specifically enforceable against
Wildwoods. 172 Finally, on the issue of apparent authority, the
court held that "[by] virtue of his office alone, no executive officer
or agent of a corporation has any authority to sell or make a con-
tract for the sale of the real estate of the corporation." 17
3
C. Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
In its most recent case on the corporate opportunity doctrine,
Today Homes, Inc. v. Williams, the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with the fiduciary's exploitation of a corporate oppor-
tunity and fiduciary duties of former officers of a corporation. 174
Emma Williams and George Woodhouse were employed as offi-
cers of Today Homes, Inc., trading as Chesapeake Homes
("Chesapeake"), a corporation in the business of developing and
building single family homes.'75 In early 2003, Williams and
169. Id. at 160, 613 S.E.2d at 404.
170. Id. at 161, 613 S.E.2d at 405.
171. Id. at 162, 613 S.E.2d at 405-06.
172. Id. at 164, 613 S.E.2d at 407 (citing Mosel & Realty Corp. v. Schofield, 183 Va.
782, 790, 33 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1945)).
173. Id. (quoting Mosel & Realty Corp., 183 Va. at 790, 33 S.E.2d at 777).
174. 272 Va. 462, 634 S.E.2d 737 (2006).
175. Id. at 466, 634 S.E.2d at 739.
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Woodhouse became aware of a parcel of real property for sale in
Hampton, Virginia, known as the "Sinclair Property," which had
been planned as a community for fifty-five and older active
adults.176 At the time, Williams and Woodhouse did not think
Chesapeake would be interested in the Sinclair Property because
Chesapeake did not engage in this type of development. 177
On March 13, 2003, Williams's employment was unexpectedly
terminated by Chesapeake. 17 Woodhouse testified that he pre-
pared a resignation letter on that date but did not submit it until
April 24, 2003.179 Since Woodhouse was the only employee with a
North Carolina contractor's license, Chesapeake convinced him to
stay on the payroll for an additional month to allow someone else
to get a North Carolina contractor's license.I8 ° Woodhouse did not
leave Chesapeake's employ until May 9, 2003.181
Meanwhile, once Williams had left Chesapeake but while
Woodhouse was still employed by Chesapeake, Williams and
Woodhouse began discussing setting up their own company, and
on March 27, 2003, they formed Majestic Homes, Inc."8 2 Majestic
Homes entered into an agreement, signed by Williams, to pur-
chase a portion of the Sinclair Property on April 15, 2003.83
Woodhouse began working for Majestic Homes on May 15,
2003.184
Chesapeake filed a bill of complaint alleging that Williams and
Woodhouse had breached their fiduciary duties as officers to
Chesapeake, that Williams aided and assisted Woodhouse in
breaching his fiduciary duties, and that they conspired to breach
their fiduciary duties.1 5 The trial court dismissed Chesapeake's
bill of complaint, holding that Chesapeake had failed to meet its
burden of proof-allocating the burden of proving that a fiduciary
duty had been breached to Chesapeake-but finding that the Sin-
clair Property was "important to [Chesapeake]" and that Chesa-
176. Id. at 466, 634 S.E.2d at 740.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 467, 634 S.E.2d at 740.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 468, 634 S.E.2d at 741.
184. Id. at 467, 634 S.E.2d at 740.
185. Id. at 468, 634 S.E.2d at 741.
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peake was "seeking other business opportunities" like the Sinclair
Property. 1
8 6
Chesapeake appealed on a number of grounds, but the two
most important were: (1) "the trial court erred in finding that
Williams and Woodhouse . . . did not breach a fiduciary duty to
Chesapeake when they failed to disclose the existence of the Sin-
clair Property to Chesapeake while one or both were still em-
ployed by Chesapeake;" and (2) "the trial court misallocated the
burden of proof by placing upon Chesapeake the burden of show-
ing the breach of fiduciary duty rather than requiring [Williams
and Woodhouse] to show that they did not breach their fiduciary
obligations."1 7
In upholding the trial court's ruling with respect to Williams
and reversing and remanding with respect to Woodhouse, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held on the burden of proof issue:
Once a plaintiff has shown that a corporate opportunity existed and
the corporate fiduciary appropriated it without disclosure and con-
sent of the corporation, a prima facie case has been shown. Under
our jurisprudence, the burden shifts to the defendant fiduciary to
show why the taking of the corporate opportunity was not a breach of
his fiduciary duty. 188
Thus, once the trial court found that the Sinclair Property was
important to Chesapeake and that Chesapeake was seeking simi-
lar opportunities, the burden was on Williams and Woodhouse,
not on Chesapeake, to prove there was no breach of fiduciary
duty.
On whether there had been a breach of fiduciary duties, the
court held that while a former officer of a corporation may still
have fiduciary duties related to opportunities that arose during
the officer's employment, Williams, in her capacity as a Chesa-
peake officer, was only casually aware of the Sinclair Property
corporate opportunity. She also had no interest in exploiting the
opportunity prior to the termination of her employment, and she
did not base the decision to take advantage of the opportunity on
information gained during her employment."8 9 Thus, Williams
186. Id.
187. Id. at 469, 634 S.E.2d at 741.
188. Id. at 473, 634 S.E.2d at 744.
189. Id. at 474, 634 S.E.2d at 744-45.
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could not breach any fiduciary duty by taking advantage of the
Sinclair Property corporate opportunity without disclosing it to
her former employer. Chesapeake still employed Woodhouse,
however, when Majestic Homes signed the agreement to purchase
a portion of the Sinclair Property.'90 For this reason, the court re-
versed and remanded with respect to Woodhouse.' 9 '
D. Corporation's Ability to Enforce Non-Competition Covenants
In Parikh v. Family Care Center, Inc., a case that created more
questions than it answered, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed a corporation's ability to enforce a non-competition cove-
nant against a physician it had previously employed.'92
On July 27, 1993, Nipun Parikh, a physician licensed in Vir-
ginia, signed an employment agreement with Family Care Cen-
ter.193 The agreement recited that Family Care Center was "en-
gaged in the practice of medicine in Lynchburg, Virginia" and
included a covenant that restricted Dr. Parikh's ability to engage
in "a competing practice of General Practice, Family Medicine
Ambulatory Care, or General Internal Medicine within a radius
of twenty miles measured from the offices of [Family Care Cen-
ter]" for three years after the termination of his employment.' 94
The employment agreement provided liquidated damages in the
amount of $10,000 per month for "each month [Parikh] is engaged
in a competing practice."'95 Family Care Center was a profes-
sional corporation solely owned by Dr. Dennis E. Burns when it
hired Dr. Parikh on July 27, 1993.196 Later in 1993, Dr. Burns
was killed in a car accident and ownership in the corporation
transferred to his widow, Karen Burns. 197 After Dr. Burns's
death, Dr. Parikh continued to work for Family Care Center but
ultimately terminated his employment as of December 31,
190. See id. at 475, 634 S.E.2d at 745 (rejecting the contention that Williams is liable
for assisting Woodhouse in his breach of fiduciary duty).
191. Id.
192. 273 Va. 284, 286, 641 S.E.2d 98, 99 (2007).
193. Id. at 286-87, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
194. Id. at 286-87, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
195. Id. at 287, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
196. Id. at 286-87, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
197. Id. at 287, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
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1993.198 He subsequently obtained employment with a similar
medical practice less than one mile from Family Care Center. 199
Family Care Center filed an action to enforce the non-compete
agreement in Campbell County Circuit Court, which determined
that Family Care Center was entitled to enforce its non-compete
agreement and awarded $210,000 in damages. 2°° Dr. Parikh ap-
pealed, asserting that Family Care Center was not licensed to
practice medicine, and consequently, it did not have a legitimate
business interest in enforcing the non-compete covenant.201
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case de novo and
restated some of its guidepost holdings in the area of enforcement
of non-compete agreements: "Restrictive covenants are disfavored
restraints on trade and, therefore, the employer bears the burden
of proof and any ambiguities in the contract will be construed in
favor of the employee," and "[a] covenant not to compete between
an employer and an employee will be enforced if the covenant is
narrowly written to protect the employer's legitimate business in-
terest, is not unduly burdensome on the employee's ability to earn
a living, and does not violate public policy." 2
2
The court held that upon Dr. Burns's death and the transfer of
ownership to Mrs. Burns, who was not licensed to practice medi-
cine in Virginia, Family Care Center converted to a non-
professional corporation by operation of law. 203 After citing Vir-
ginia Code sections 54.1-2930, 54.1-2929, 54.1-2902, and 54.1-
111(A), which require any person who practices medicine in Vir-
ginia to be licensed, the court concluded that a non-professional
corporation cannot obtain a license to practice medicine, and thus
204
cannot engage in the practice of medicine in Virginia. Based on
this holding, the court found that Family Care Center had no le-
gitimate business interest in enforcing its covenant not to com-
pete.205
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 286, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
201. Id. at 287-88, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
202. Id. at 288, 641 S.E.2d at 100 (citations omitted).
203. Id. at 287, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
204. Id. at 289-90, 641 S.E.2d at 100-01.
205. Id. at 291, 641 S.E.2d at 101.
[Vol. 42:273
CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
Although the court determined Dr. Parikh's fate, its decision
left open many questions. Despite Family Care Center arguing
that section 13.1-542.1 permits a non-professional corporation to
"render" professional services, the court declined to rule on what
"render" means, possibly leaving room to later draw a distinction
between being "engaged in the practice of medicine" and "render-
ing" healing arts. 2 6 The court also left open the questions of
whether a professional or non-professional corporation can em-
ploy a physician and whether any entity could have a legitimate
business interest in enforcing restrictive covenants if the em-
ployment agreement recited that the entity rendered professional
services through its employed licensed physicians. Until the court
answers these questions, practitioners will have difficulty provid-
ing clients advice on an entity's ability to enforce restrictive cove-
nants in the context of licensed professions where the entity can-
not obtain a license to engage in the profession.
E. Fiduciary Duties of Managers; Amendment to Articles of
Organization to Permit Termination of a Member
In Gowin v. Granite Depot, LLC, the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed: (i) whether an amendment to a limited liability com-
pany's articles of organization to provide for termination of a
member's interest upon failure to make a required capital contri-
bution was a breach of fiduciary duty; (ii) whether an individual
manager's waiver binds the limited liability company; and (iii)
whether the failure to make payments under a note delivered as a
capital contribution constitutes a failure to make the required
capital contribution.207
John Stathis and Patrick Gowin held eighty percent and
twenty percent membership interests, respectively, in Granite
Depot.208 Stathis was also the sole manager of the limited liability
company and Gowin was employed by the limited liability com-
pany.209 For his twenty percent membership interest, Gowin con-
tributed a promissory note in the amount of $12,500 and no
cash. 2"0 The $12,500 promissory note bore an interest rate of nine
206. Id. at 290, 641 S.E.2d at 101.
207. See 272 Va. 246, 250, 634 S.E.2d at 714, 717 (2006).
208. Id. at 250, 634 S.E.2d at 717.
209. See id.
210. See id.
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percent, and required twenty-four payments, with the first pay-
ment due on February 1, 2000.211 In November of 2000, when
Gowin became a member and Stathis asked him to sign the note,
Stathis stated that the note was "something [the company's law-
yer] said had to be done" and that "the company would take care
of it. 2 12 Gowin made no payments under the note.2
1 3
On May 31, 2002, Gowin terminated his employment with
Granite Depot but did not surrender his membership interest.214
Shortly thereafter, Stathis, acting as member and manager: (i)
amended the articles of organization of Granite Depot "to allow
the members by majority vote" to terminate the membership in-
terest of any member that failed to make its capital contribution;
and (ii) "executed a written consent of members" removing Gowin
as a member for failing to make his capital contribution." 5
Gowin filed a derivative action on Granite Depot's behalf
against Stathis. The trial court ultimately found that "termina-
tion of membership for failure to meet the capital contribution re-
quirement was not a breach of fiduciary duty."216 The court also
found that, although Stathis waived payment under the note,
"absent from the record is any evidence that the corporation af-
firmed the actions of Mr. Stathis."217
Gowin, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, asserted
among other things that: (i) Granite Depot had affirmed the ac-
tions of Stathis in waiving the note payments; (ii) the adoption of
an amendment to the articles of organization allowing for the
termination of a member's interest for failure to make a capital
contribution was a breach of fiduciary duty; and (iii) because of its
ambiguous payment terms, the note was a demand note, no de-
mand had been made, the note was not due and payable, and
therefore, there was no failure to make the capital contribution in
a timely fashion. 218
211. Id. at 257, 634 S.E.2d at 721.
212. Id. at 251, 634 S.E.2d at 717.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 251, 634 S.E.2d at 717.
217. Id. at 252, 634 S.E.2d at 718.
218. See id.
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Because neither the articles of organization or operating
agreement addressed waiver of capital contributions, the court
based its holding that Granite Depot had not affirmed Stathis's
waiver of the note payments on Virginia Code section 13.1-
1027(C), which requires that a member's obligation to make a
capital contribution "may be compromised only by consent of all
the members unless the operating agreement or articles provide
otherwise."219 The court also based its decision on section 13.1-
1022(E), which the court interpreted to allow action to be taken
by a limited liability company's members outside of a meeting
"only when the requisite number of members sign a document re-
flecting the action taken and their consent to it."22° Because nei-
ther the articles of organization nor the operating agreement ad-
dressed waiver of capital contributions, and there was neither a
meeting of the members waiving the note payments nor an action
in writing of the members waiving payment, the court held no
waiver had occurred.22'
The court addressed Stathis's fiduciary duties to the limited li-
ability company but it did not address any fiduciary duties be-
tween the members. The court found the amendment had no im-
pact on the company and Stathis adopted it both to ensure capital
contributions were made to the company and to eliminate
Gowin's interest. 222 The court held there was no error in the trial
court's finding that an after-the-fact amendment of a limited li-
ability company's articles of organization to allow for termination
of a membership interest for a failure to make a capital contribu-
tion was not a breach of fiduciary duty.223
The court held the $12,500 note was a demand note because
the note's payment terms required Gowin to begin making pay-
219. Id. at 253, 634 S.E.2d at 718.
220. Id. The court also indicated its willingness to apply the "closed corporation" or
"corporate formalities" rule to limited liability companies. Presumably, under the rule, de-
spite a limited liability company's failure to formally act to ratify or affirm a given action
by a manager or member, if its managers and members generally fail to ignore obligations
in the limited liability company statute and its organizational documents to take such
formal corporate action, the limited liability company may be bound by the actions of a
manager or member. However, the court declined to apply it in this matter because there
was not sufficient evidence that Stathis and Granite Depot ignored limited liability com-
pany formalities. See id. at 254-56, 634 S.E.2d at 719-20.
221. See id. at 256, 634 S.E.2d at 720.
222. See id. at 258-59, 634 S.E.2d at 722.
223. Id. at 259, 634 S.E.2d at 722.
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ments almost two years before he signed the note, and the pay-
ment terms were too ambiguous for the note to be payable at a
specific time.224 Because the note was a demand note, and Stathis
had made no demand for payment, there was no failure on the
part of Gowin to make the required capital contribution.225 The
court reversed the trial court on this issue and remanded the case
for further proceedings.
26
VII. CONCLUSION
In many respects, the 2005 update to the Virginia Act has
caused a cascade of targeted changes throughout the various
business entity statutes. As discussed in Section II, this included
targeted changes within the Virginia Act designed to further re-
fine the 2005 overhaul. Section II also covered the amendments to
the Nonstock Act to conform it to some of the 2005, 2006, and
2007 revisions to the Virginia Act. In addition, as discussed in
Section III, the LLC Act and the Virginia RULPA have been re-
vised in some respects to conform to the amendments to the Vir-
ginia Act in 2005, 2006, and 2007.
In contrast, as discussed in Section IV, revisions to the statutes
governing professional corporations and professional limited li-
ability companies were almost entirely related to the unique is-
sues of professional entities. Similarly, Section V reviewed some
of the changes to the Virginia Act and the Virginia Securities Act
to address very specific concerns related to open-end investment
companies registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940, transactional exemptions from registration, and the ability
of a broker-dealer, or more than one broker-dealer, to employ a
broker-dealer agent.
Finally, Section VI highlighted opinions issued by the Supreme
Court of Virginia that may affect the way practitioners draft cor-
porate and limited liability company governance documents,
agreements, and authorizing resolutions related to the sale of a
corporation's assets. These decisions also affect the lawyer's abil-
ity to advise their clients on the scope of the corporate opportu-
nity doctrine in Virginia.
224. See id. at 257-58, 634 S.E.2d at 721.
225. Id. at 258, 634 S.E.2d at 721.
226. Id. at 259, 634 S.E.2d at 722.
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